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The Effects of Alternative Seasonal Price
Differentials on Milk Production in New
York
Harry M. Kaiser, Pascal A. Oltenacu, and Terry R. Smith
Uneven monthly milk production (seasonality) is a major problem to the New York dairy
industry. This article estimates expected monthly milk production response to a set of
hypothetical seasonal price differentials designed to reduce the degree of seasonality. The
analysis is based on a random mail survey and farm record data. The results indicate that a
seasonal price differential of $1.12 per cwt. (over three times the current differential) would
be necessary to completely balance spring and fall production in New York, based on the
perceptions of farmers surveyed. Also, producers with better managerial skills are shown to
be able to reduce their seasonality at a significantly lower price differential than less skilled
farm managers.
Introduction
New York dairy farmers produce significantly more
milk in the spring than in the fall. For example,
between 1980 and 1986, spring milk production
(March, April, May, and June) averaged 35. 8%,
while fall production (August, September, Octo-
ber, and November) averaged 31.6% of total an-
nual production (Federal Order No. 2 Statistical
Handbook, 1957– 1986). In other words, the state’s
dairy farmers produced on average over 13% more
milk in the spring than they did in the fall.
Milk production seasonality has long been rec-
ognized as an important and serious problem facing
the dairy industry, particularly among manufac-
turers of non-fluid dairy products, e.g. cheese and
butter-powder. Uneven monthly supplies of raw
milk between the spring and the fall raises handlers’
operating costs and reduces their level of effi-
ciency. The costs to handlers are primarily due to
excess capacity in trucks, storage facilities, and
plants, which may be run at capacity in the spring,
but run at levels far below capacity for the re-
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mainder of the year. These costs are partially passed
along to consumers in the form of higher prices.
Seasonality also costs taxpayers, since surplus milk
(in the form of butter, nonfat dry milk, and cheese)
is removed in the spring under the dairy price sup-
port program. A more uniform milk production
pattern would greatly reduce the costly seasonal
balancing functions of this program.
To counter this problem, federal and state milk
marketing orders in New York State have utilized
seasonal price incentive programs since 1967. These
programs are designed to even out seasonality by
providing farmers financial incentives (disincen-
tives) through the price. During the spring, deduc-
tions from the farm price discourage excess
production, and in the fall premiums to the price
stimulate additional production. In 1972, the de-
ductions and premiums were doubled to keep pace
with inflation. However, since 1972 these differ-
entials have not changed, and in real terms, the
financial incentives to change seasonal production
have become substantially weaker.
The principal objective of this paper is to analyze
anticipated production response to several hypo-
thetical levels of seasonal price differentials. This
research differs from the majority of previous re-
search (i.e., Hall, et al.; Prindle and Livezey; Caine
and Stonehouse; and the New York-New Jersey
Milk Market Administrator’s Office, 1984) in that
it focuses on aggregate rather than individual pro-
duction response to different seasonal price levels.
The analysis is based on producer perceptions elic-
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dairy farmers in New York State, and farm record
data on survey respondents obtained from the New
York-New Jersey federal milk marketing order.
Monthly perceived milk production responses to
several seasonal price differentials are simulated
for (1) the entire state, and (2) different segments
of the state’s dairy farm population, based on se-
lected producer characteristics. The perceived pro-
duction responses are used to evaluate the
effectiveness of the current price incentive plan
used to address the seasonality problem and to pre-
dict the price differential needed to balance spring
and fall production.
Background
Figure 1 illustrates the seasonal pattern of milk
production by month for New York. In developing
this figure, average monthly production for 1980–
86 was divided by the 12 month average to show
the monthly variation in milk production through-
out the year. 1 New York milk production, on av-
erage, is highest in May with over 8% more milk
being produced than the 12 month average, and
lowest in November with about 6.5% less milk
produced than the 12 month average.
Seasonality is due to the fact that a greater pro-
portion of cows freshen in the spring than in other
seasons of the year, The high degree of spring
freshening is likely due to the availability of pasture
during this season and the natural tendency for
cows to freshen in the spring (Prindle). In addition
to biological factors, seasonality is also caused by
producer perceptions that spring milk production
is more profitable (Quinn and Wasserman). On the
other hand, recent research has indicated that these
perceptions may in fact be incorrect (Hall, O1ten-
acu, and Milligan). The findings in Hall, et al.
provide evidence that there is no significant rela-
tionship between net revenue (per herd) and season
of the year. Hence, this evidence suggests that sea-
sonality is not caused by profitability factors per
se, but rather by farmer perceptions that spring milk
production is more profitable than production in
any other season.
Seasonality is far more of a problem for man-
ufacturers of Class H products than for processors
of fluid (Class 1) products, because fluid eligible





















m MM IIAY JULY SW’T NW
Uom
n %Umth!y V.ddon
Figure 1. Variation in Milk Production
New York State (12 month ave. = 100),
1980-1986
priced Class I demand first, with the remainder sold
to Class II manufacturers.2 Since more raw milk
is always produced in New York than Class I de-
mands, fluid processors have a fairly reliable source
of raw milk in their plants year round, and therefore
can build their operations based on their product
demand and a uniform raw milk supply throughout
the year. On the other hand, Class II balancing
plants in the state face highly uneven excess sup:
plies of raw milk. This phenomenon makes it dif-
ficult for these Class 11balancers to operate their
plants efficiently since in order to process all the
excess raw milk in the spring they need to build
plant capacity at a level where much will remain
idle in the fall under the prevailing seasonality of
milk production. For example, in 1985 the daily
receipts for the three largest manufacturing plants
in the New York-New Jersey federal milk mar-
keting order were more than “389Z0 higher in May
than in November (Hall, Oltenacu, and Milligan).
Since dairy cooperatives perform the market ‘‘bal-
ancing” function for raw milk throughout the year,
they are especially vulnerable to this problem.
To respond to seasonality, 18 out of 48 federal
milk marketing orders operated seasonal price in-
centive plans in 1986 (Kaiser). Individual produc-
ers will generally not consciously change their
patterns of seasonality unless the economic incen-
tives or disincentives associated with these pro-
grams make it profitable to adjust freshening
management practices to achieve a more uniform
[ The months in this figure were adjusted to have an equal number of
days for comparison purposes. This was done by first computing average
daily production for each month and then multiplying the resulting figure
by 30.4375 (which is 365.25 days divided by 12). The data for computing
this figure were obtained from the New York Agricultural Statistics
Service, 1987.
2 Federal and state milk marketing orders in the Northeast categorize
raw Grade A milk into two classes: Class I and Class 11.Class I includes
all Grade A milk processed into fluid products and Class 11includes all
Grade A milk processed into manufactured dairy products. Under the
classified pricing system used in all milk marketing orders, Class I
handlers must pay higher minimum raw milk prices to farmers than the
non-fluid Class [1 handlers of raw Grade A milk.48 April 1988 NJARE
monthly production. Hence, to be effective, the
seasonal program must be designed to offer incen-
tives (disincentives) significant enough to induce
an adequate number of producers to become sea-
sonally-even or contra-seasonal to cause the ag-
fgegate supply of milk to be more uniform throughout
the year. The economic incentives (disincentives)
of all existing seasonal pricing programs take the
form of penalties in the spring and price premiums
in the fall. Two types of programs are commonly
used: the Louisville and Base-Excess plans.
The New York-New Jersey and the New York
State milk marketing orders have operated Louis-
ville programs since 1967. The Louisville plan re-
quires a specific amount of money to be withheld
from the blend price during the spring and then
added back, along with interest earned, in the fall.
In March, April, May, and June, the Market Ad-
ministrator withholds 20, 30, 40, and 40 cents per
cwt., respectively, from the blend price and these
proceeds are placed in an interest bearing escrow
account. Then, in August, September, and Octo-
ber, the blend price is augmented by 25%, 30%,
and 3090, respectively, of this escrow fund. In No-
vember, the remaining 1570, plus any interest, is
added back to the blend price. On average, the
current Louisville plan results in a total seasonal
price swing of approximately 70 cents per cwt.,
including interest, which corresponds to about a
$0.35 seasonal price differential (New York-New
Jersey Milk Market Administrator’s Office, 1986).
Base-Excess seasonal incentive programs also
use price differentials, but operate differently than
Louisville plans. Under Base-Excess plans, each
producer is usually assigned a production “base,”
equal to average daily production during the four
fall months (August through November). Prices
paid to producers depend upon this base. Under a
12-month program, farmers receive the’ ‘base price”
on all milk sold within their base and receive a
lower’ ‘excess price” on milk sold over their base,
According to current federal order provisions, the
excess price cannot be lower than the lowest class
price (Kaiser). While somewhat different in struc-
ture, both plans are meant to provide incentives for
increasing fall production and/or decreasing spring
production, thereby leveling out seasonality. Cur-
rently, economists in the Northeast are examining
the possibility of replacing the Louisville plan with
a Base-Excess plan in the New York-New Jersey
and New England federal milk marketing orders.
The Louisville program has likely resulted in
more even production than would have occurred
without it. However, as Figure 1 indicates, New
York still faces significant fluctuations in monthly
milk production with the Louisville plan in place.
The main reasons usually cited for the failure of
the Louisville program to even out production more
are: 1) the lack of financial incentives to producers
to change their seasonal production patterns, and
2) the lack of producer awareness of the existence
of the program.3 A recent study of the impact of
four seasonal pricing plans on net farm income
levels found that the current Louisville plan had
the least impact in terms of creating financial in-
centives to reduce seasonality of all plans consid-
ered (New York-New Jersey Market Administrator’s
Office, 1984). Of the other three programs eval-
uated in this research, a 12 Month Base-Excess
plan offered the largest income incentives to reduce
seasonality, followed by a Double Louisville and
a 4-Month Base-Excess plans.4
While the effectiveness of the Louisville plan
has been questioned and addressed in previous re-
search, there is also evidence that the differentials
of the Base-Excess plan are too low. A 1980 study
of the Base-Excess plan used in Maryland con-
cluded that the then existing incentives of the pro-
gram were insufficient in terms of encouraging a
more uniform monthly production (Prindle). Sim-
ilar to one of the problems cited for the Louisville
plan, the differential between the base and the ex-
cess price ($1. 53 difference between the base and
the excess price at that time) was too low according
to the results of Prindle’s study.
Methodology
This study was designed to estimate how dairy
producers, in the aggregate, would adjust their ex-
isting monthly milk production in response to four
hypothetical seasonal price differentials. The hy-
pothetical seasonal differentials considered were
designed to make prices received by farmers lower
in the first half and higher in the second half of the
year. Since no structure of how the price differ-
entials would work was proposed or suggested in
the survey, the results may be used to examine
production response implications of both types of
seasonal price incentive programs currently used
in federal orders. The first scenario, which contains
3 Under the curmrrt Louisville program, the take-outs and pay-backs
to the blend price are not reported on producers’ milk checks. Conse-
quently, many producers may be unaware of the program and therefore
do not respond to these firraacird incentives. Based on the dairy farmer
survey results, 35% of the respmrdents were unaware of tbe Louisville
plan.
4 A Double Louisville plan works the same as the current program
except the take-out and pay-back levels are doubled. A 4-month Base-
Excess plan has the base and excess prices in effect only in the 4 spring
months rather than year round as the 12-Month Base-Excess program
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no seasonal price differential, is used as a base to
compare how producers would respond to different
intra-year price differentials as well as to compare
resulting seasonality coefficients with those of the
now existing $0.35 differential associated with the
Louisville program. In the three remaining scen-
arios, producers receive a $1.00, $2.00, and $3.00
per cwt. deduction from the blend price in January
through June and similar premiums from July through
December.5 These price differentials were pur-
posely higher than the Louisville plan actually used
in New York in order to determine the differential
that would balance spring and fall production. Since
differentials of this magnitude have never been used
in New York, a survey of the state’s dairy farmers
was needed to elicit producer perceptions of their
likely response to these hypothetical pricing pro-
grams. The respondents’ perceived production re-
sponses would not take place instmtaneously, but
would rather take one to two years to achieve,
especially at the higher range of the price differ-
entials. Hence, the estimated production responses
in this analysis should be considered longer term.
The Data
The data used in this research were obtained from
a mail survey conducted between November 1986
and January 1987. This survey was initiated as part
of a more comprehensive study of milk production
seasonality in New York (Oltenacu, Smith, and
Kaiser). A total of 2,465 farmers were randomly
selected from a population of the approximately
12,970 commercial dairy farmers in New York State.
From this sample, 1,169 (47.4%) completed or
partially completed questionnaires were returned.
In order to determine whether the respondents
to the survey were representative of the New York
dairy farm population, average values of selected
farm characteristics for respondents were compared
to published state averages. Based on average cow
numbers per farm, production per cow, and pro-
duction per farm, as reported in New York Agri-
cultural Statistics for 1986, the survey respondents
appeared to be quite representative of the overall
population. For example, New York dairy farmers
averaged 73 cows per farm, 12,401 pounds of milk
per cow, and 905,273 pounds of milk per farm in
1985. These averages were very close to the survey
5 In this article, the term 4‘price differential” means the level of the
deduction from or premium to the price rather than the total or ahsohrte
seasonal difference in price. For instance, a $2.00 price differential
means that $2.00 is deducted frnm the farm price inthe first half of the
year, and $2,00 is added to the price in the second half of the year.
Hence, a $2.00 price differential is equivalent to a $4.00 annual’ ‘swing”
in the price.
respondents, who averaged 77 cows per farm, 12,922
pounds production per cow, and 995,024 pounds
of milk production per farm.
Potential non-response bias in the survey was
also tested. Eight y individuals from those who re-
ceived, but did not return the questionnaire, were
randomly selected for a telephone follow up inter-
view. The purpose of the follow up was to ascertain
whether there were any significant differences in
responses between respondents and nonrespon-
dents. There were no statistically significant dif-
ferences between selected survey responses for the
two groups (Oltenacu, Smith, and Kaiser). Hence,
based on these procedures, the survey data were
judged representative of New York dairy farmers
with no apparent non-response bias.
Two sources of data were used to estimate within-
year milk production ~sponse to the different pricing
levels. The first source was information obtained
from the survey. Producers were asked what per-
cent of their annual production they would produce
in the first six months and the second six months
of the year for each of the four different seasonal
price incentive programs. The responses to this
question, in essence, represent farmers’ percep-
tions regarding the benefits and costs of making
adjustments in their seasonal patterns of milk pro-
duction in response to the hypothetical pricing lev-
els. Monthly rather than semi-annual information
would have been desirable. However, it was felt
that a lower survey response rate would have re-
sulted due to the increased complexity of the ques-
tion needed to elicit response at this level of detail.
All respondent that were in the Milk Diversion
Program, the Dairy Termination Program, or were
members of cooperatives that use seasonal price
incentive plans were excluded from the sample.
These farmers were excluded since they would have
biased the patterns of normal production season-
ality. The omission of these producers, in addition
to respondents that did not complete all of the rel-
evant questions for this analysis, brought the total
number of usable questionnaires to 343.’
To disaggregate each farmer’s semi-annual per-
ceived production response to a monthly basis, a
second data source was needed. The second source
of information was actual average monthly milk
marketing of survey respondents from 1980 to
1986. These data were supplied by the New York-
New Jersey Federal Milk Market Administrator’s
Office.
The Model
The following procedures and assumptions were
used to estimate monthly milk production response50 April 1988 NJARE
to the alternative seasonal price levels. First, based
on the survey responses, the percentage changes
in production for January through June and for July
through December were calculated for the $1.00,
$2.00, and $3.00 price differentials. This provided
a measure of farmers’ perceptions or assertions of
how much they would be willing to decrease pro-
duction in the first half and increase production in
the second half of the year in response to these
seasonal price differences. Next, each producer’s
indicated semi annual percentage changes in pro-
duction for each differential were multiplied by his
average monthly milk marketing as a percent of
annual marketing (1980–86) in order to disaggre-
gate response to a monthly basis. Each of the twelve
months of the year were adjusted to have equal
days in order to correct for biases caused bv une-
qu~l days in actual months for comparison pur-
poses. This was accomplished by first computing
average daily milk marketing and then multiplying
the resulting number by 30.4375 for each month.
This resulted in all twelve “adjusted months” hav-
ing an equal number of days. The following equa-
tion was used to accomplish the first adjustment:
(1) MPij = MPi X PR~j,
where:
MPij = Milk production (9.), adjusted month i,
under seasonal price differential j, (j =
$0.00, $1.00, $2.00, and $3.00);
MPi = Actual average milk production (%), ad-
justed month i, from 1980 to 1986;
PR~j = Percentage change in semi-annual milk
production k (i.e., k = January to June
and July to December) from the $0.00
price difference for seasonal price dif-
ferential j (j = $1.00,$2.00, and $3.00),
This procedure implicitly assumed that the price
differential under the Louisville plan was zero, which
was not true. In other words, the results from equa-
tion (1) were such that production under the zero
price differential corresponded to actual average
monthly production for each respondent even though
a $0.35 differential was already in effect. This was
not a problem in calculating perceived production
response for respondents who had no knowledge
of the Louisville program since they were ob-
viously unaware of the $0.35 price differential. For
these producers, who represented approximately
35% of the sample, production response was es-
timated using equation (1).
However, equation (1) had to be adjusted to reflect
the $0.35 differential for the survey respondents
who did have knowledge of the Louisville program
since they were aware of this differential. Equation
(1), in effect, resulted in production response for
price differentials ranging from $0.35 to $3.35 rather
than $0.00 to $3.00, for these respondents since
equation (1) did not adjust for the actual differential
in effect for this period. Therefore, for respondents
having knowledge of the Louisville plan, equation
(1) was adjusted for the $1.00, $2.00, and $3.00
differential using,
(2) AMPij = ((ME’ij – MF’ij- ~)/O.65)
X 0.35) + MPij,
where:
AMPij = Adjusted milk production (%), ad-
justed month i, under seasonal price
differential j (j = $1.00, $2.00, and
$3.00), adjusted to correct for the
$0.35 price differential (Louisville
plan) for base period production.
The $0.00 price differential was transformed using,
(3) AMPiO = ((MPiO – TiO)/0.65)
X 0.35) + TiO,
where:
TiO= ((MPiO – MPil)/2) + MPiO.
Through equations (2) and (3), the $0.35 impact
of the Louisville plan implicitly embodied in equa-
tion (1) was adjusted for the respondents having
knowledge of the Louisville program.
Based on these procedures, seasonality coeffi-
cients were calculated for each price differential.
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forj = $0.00, $1.00, $2.00, and $3.00. A positive
coefficient implies a seasonal pattern, a zero coef-
ficient implies no seasonal pattern, and a negative
coefficient implies a contra-seasonal pattern of milk
production. These coefficients were used to quan-
tify changes in dairy farmers’ seasonal patterns of
production under the various pricing plans.
After estimating equations (1) through (4) for
each producer having knowledge of the $0.35 price
differential, and equation (1) and (4) for those not
having knowledge of the $0.35 price differential,
the results were averaged to obtain an aggregate
perceived production response. A weighted aver-
age, based on the amount of milk each farmer pro-
duced, was used to account for differences in size
and production per cow among survey respondents.
It must be stressed that the estimates of farmer
production response to these price differentials are
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predict with complete certainty what would occur
under these alternative price differentials since they
have never been implemented before, Hence, some
“crystal-balling” on the part of producers is in-
herent in the estimated production response, par-
ticularly for the higher segments of the price
differential range, e.g. $2.00 and $3,00. However,
because the perceived response to the differentials
were adjusted by actual patterns of past seasonality
(based upon 1980-86 historical marketing for each
farm), the estimates of production responses prob-
ably give a fairly accurate indication of expected
producer behavior.
Simulations and Tests
The model was used to simulate expected aggregate
milk production response to these seasonal plans
for (1) the entire state and (2) different segments
of the state’s producers to test whether each group
would respond identically. The first simulation has
three important restdts. First, the model was used
to simulate the impact of alternative price differ-
entials on New York seasonalit y. Estimates of sea-
sonality were obtained for all seasonal price
differentials in the $0.00 to $3.00 interval through
linear interpolation. The relationship between sea-
sonality and the level of the seasonal price differ-
ential is of particular interest to policy makers and
cooperative officials in evaluating alternative pricing
plans on an ex ante as opposed to ex post basis.
Second, the price differential necessary to com-
pletely even out differences in spring and fall
production was calculated. While complete elim-
ination of seasonalit is likely to be too costly as
1 well as undesirable, the level of this differential
was computed for two reasons. First, it provides
policy makers with an estimate of how much it
would cost to have uniform spring and fall pro-
duction. Second, this “complete balancing” dif-
ferential serves as a useful number to compare
production response between sub-groups in the
sample (see second simulation described below).
The effectiveness of the current Louisville program
on reducing seasonality was also determined in the
first simulation. Statistical tests of whether the cur-
rent program had any impact on seasonality were
performed.
A second test of simulations examined whether
certain classes of farmers would be expected to
6 It should be noted that the objective of seasonal price incentive plans
is not to obtain a constant and completely uniform monthly supply of
raw milk. Indeed some seasomdity is probably desirable, especially from
a milk production efficiency point of view. Rather the objective is to
lessen tbe serious imbalance between spring and fall supply and demand
that currently exists.
respond differently to the different price scenarios.
The model was solved for different segments of
the sample population and statistical tests were con-
ducted to ascertain whether production responses
to the price differentials differed between groups.
It was hypothesized that farmers with better man-
agerial skills would be able to even out spring and
fall production at a lower within year price differ-
ence than less managerial astute producers. Rather
than constructing a “managerial ability” index to
test this hypothesis, the sample was divided into
several groups that were hypothesized to be proxies
for these attributes and compared pairwise using a
two-tailed t-test of whether their mean seasonality
coefficients by price differential were statistically
different.
The first pairing placed members of the Dairy
Herd Improvement (DHI) association into one group,
and nonmembers in another group. It was hypoth-
esized that DHI members are better managers and
would therefore balance within year production at
a lower price differential than non-DHI members.
The second pairing was based on a crude produc-
tion efficiency measure, production per cow. Re-
spondents were grouped by those that produced
14,000 pounds of milk per cow or less and those
that produced more than 14,000 pounds of milk
per cow in 1986. It was postulated that producers
with higher production per cow are better managers
and would even out seasonal production at a lower
price difference than farmers with lower producing
herds. The third pairwise test compared producers
with 12 or less years of formal education with farm-
ers with more than 12 years of formal education.
A priori, more highly educated farm managers are
expected to be more innovative and would be more
responsive to adjusting monthly production pat-
terns at lower mice differences than their counter-
parts. A fourt~ and somewhat related comparison
based on age was also made. Producers younger
than the sample mean (42 years of age) are expected
to be more innovative, on average, than older farm-
ers and, therefore, would be more responsive to
the price differentials in changing seasonal pro-
duction. The fifth grouping was based on herd size,
with the cow number division set at 65 cows. Pro-
ducers with larger herds were hypothesized to be
more price responsive in adjusting their production
than farmers with smaller herds. Finally, a com-
parison was made between producers that rely sub-
stantially upon pasture feeding in the spring with
those that use pastures less and utilize supplemental
feeding more, The two groups were divided into
producers who indicated they pastured milking cows
for more than 12 hours per day in May and June
and those that pastured cows 12 hours or less per52 April 1988 NJARE
day in these two months. It was postulated that
producers who used supplemental feeding and rely
less on pasture feeding would balance spring and
fall production at a lower differential than more
pasture intensive farmers.
The Results
The results of the first simulation are presented in
Figure 2, representing the relationship between
production seasonality, as quantified by the sea-
sonality coefficient, and alternative price differ-
entials. As expected, the range of price differentials
was more than sufficient to even out spring and fall
milk production. The seasonality coefficient ranged
from a high of 0.19, under the $0.00 price differ-
ential scenario, to a low of – 0.17, under the $3
price differential. The figure also indicates that
changes in aggregate perceived production re-
sponse to these price differentials is more price
sensitive in the $0.35 to $1.00 range of differen-
tials. For instance, the seasonality coefficient was
reduced by 0.17 points as the differential was in-
creased from $0.00 to $1.00. As the differential
was increased from $1.00 to $2.00, the seasonality
coefficient declined by a lower increment of O.13
points, Finally, as the price differential was in-
creased from $2.00 to $3.00, the seasonality
coefficient declined by only 0.06 points. This result
is consistent with the fact that there are obviously
limitations on the extent that producers perceive
they can reverse their seasonal milk production
patterns.
Based on the results of the first simulation, a
seasonal price differential of about $1.12 per cwt.
would balance spring and fall milk production in
New York. This amount is 3.2 times more than
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Figure 2. Estimated Seasonality Coefficient by
Price Differential, Entire Sample
seasonal price differential would have to change
significantly to completely level milk production
in these two seasons of the year. In addition to
balancing spring and fall production, a price dif-
ferential of $1.12 would also reduce overall monthly
variation in production. For instance, the variance
of average monthly milk production as a percent
of annual production falls from 0.31 percent to 0.14
pe~ent when the price differential is increased from
$0.00 to $1.00. This reduction in monthly variation
of milk production due to the price differential is
illustrated graphically in Figure 3, which shows the
seasonality index by month for the $0.00 and the
$1.00 price differential. This figure provides evi-
dence that overall monthly variation in milk pro-
duction is reduced when the price differential is
increased from $0.00 to $1.00. It should be noted,
however, that the extremely high price differentials
of $2.00 and $3.00 cause a greater seasonal vari-
ation plan than no price differential at all. Under
these large differentials, contra-seasonalit y be-
comes a problem.
The results of the first simulation also indicate
that the current Louisville plan reduced seasonality
in New York. From 1980 to 1986, the average
seasonalit y coefficient at the $0.35 differential was
0.15. If the price of milk would have been uniform
year round for this period, the seasonality coeffi-
cient would have been higher, i.e. approximately
0.19. A statistical test of the null hypothesis that
the Louisville plan had no impact on lowering the
seasonalit y coefficient was conducted. The null hy-
pothesis was conclusively rejected at the 0.005
confidence level, providing evidence that the
Louisville plan does reduce seasonality.7
Table 1 reports the results of the second set of
simulations. In this table, the production responses
to the price differentials are shown for the group-
ings of the sample based on selected farm char-
acteristics.
Two of the most striking results of these simu-
lations were the DHI/non-DHI and level of formal
education comparisons. Producers with more for-
mal education had sadistically different seasonal
7A standard one-tailed t-test of the difference between two means
was used to test for tbe statistical significance of tbe Louisville plan in
reducing seasonality. The following formula was used to compute the
t-statistic:
t = [SCO – SC{),35]/[(V(SCO)/nl) + (V(SCO ,5)h2)l”2
where:
SC, = Average seasonality coefficient, price differential j (j = 0.00
and 0.35); V(SCj) = Variance of the seasonality coefficient, price dif-
ferential i (i = O,lXtand 0.35); nl = sample size of botb groups (nl =
nz in this-case). The computed t-statistic in this test was 2.72, indicating
strong evidence to reject tbe null hypothesis that the Louisville plan had
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Figure 3. Monthly Variation in Milk Produc-
tion for a $0 and $1 Price Differential
production responses than farmers with less formal
education for all differentials considered. On av-
erage, farmers with more than 12 years of educa-
tion needed a price difference of $0.95 and producers
with 12 or less years of formal education required
a price difference of $1.35 to even out production.
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The DHI and non-DHI farmers had statistically
different seasonality coefficients at every price dif-
ferential except $2.00 and $3.00, with the DHI
members having lower levels of seasonality than
non-DHI members on average at these price dif-
ferentials. The results showed that a balance be-
tween spring and fall production would be achieved
at a $1.03 differential for DHI members and a
$1.35 differential for nonmembers. These results
support the hypothesis that efficiency and manage-
ment ability are directly related to degree of price
responsiveness to these programs since education
and DHI membership likely reflect producers’ man-
agerial skill level.
Size of herd and production per cow were found
to significantly affect production response to the
hypothetical programs. Operations with smaller herds
had significantly higher seasonality coefficients for
the $0.00 through $1.00 differentials than farms
with larger herd sizes. Not surprisingly, farmers
with more than 65 cows required a lower seasonal
price difference ($0.97) to balance spring and fall
production than operations with 65 or fewer cows,
Table 1. Milk Production Response by Seasonal Price Differential for Selected Groups
in the Survey Sample
Price ---------------Education--------------- --------------------DHI-------------------- -----------------Herd Size------------------
Difference <= 12 Yrs 12+ Yrs Member Nonmember < =65 COWS >65 COWS
($/cwt.) (Se) (Se) t-stat* (Se) (Se) t-stat* (Se) (Se) t-stat*
$0.00 0.214 0.164 2.160 0.174 0,230 –2.065 0.210
$0.35
0,166 1.869
0.176 0.115 2.940 0.130 0.189 –2.426 0.165 0.124 I.937
$1.00 0.039 –0.010 1.940 0.002 0.047 – 1.330 0.030 –0.003 1.331
$2.00 –0.070 –0.163 2.695 –0.123 –0.097 –0.617 –0.097 –0.137
$3.00
1.151
–0.087 –0.258 2.512 –0,180 –0.148 –0.450 –0.149 –0.196 0.652
Balancing
PriceDiff
($/cwt)** $1.35 $0.95 $1.03 $1.35 $1.23 $0.97
No. of Ob-
servations 174 169 248 95 184 159
Price ---Lbs of Milk Produced/Cow---- -------------------- Age--------------------- ------Hrs/Cow/Day Pasture Time ------
Difference < = 14000 14001+ < = 42 Yrs >42 Yrs <12 Hrs >= 12 Hrs
($/cwt.) (Se) (Se) t-stat* (Se) (Se) t-stat* (Se) (Se) t-stat*
$0.00 0.213 0.166 1.991 0.167 0.217 -2.083 0.176 0,202 1.092
$0.35 0.171 0.122 2.337 0.124 0.174 –2.320 0.132 0.160 1.331
$1.00 0.028 –0.002 1.097 –0.008 0.044 – 1.977 0.004 0.026 0.840
$2.00 –0.112 –0.125 0.378 –0.140 –0.086 -1.547 –0.121 -0.110 0.315
$3.00 –0.177 –0.179 0.035 –0.188 –0.150 –0.583 –0.167 –0.175 –0.109
Brdancing
Price Diff
($/cwt)** $1.20 $1.00 $0.95 $1.35 $1.03 $1.19
No. of Ob-
servations 152 191 191 152 172 171
*Two-tailed t-test for whether the means of the two groups are equal.
**Semonal pfic,edifferential that results in equal spring and fall milk production.54 April 1988 NJARE
which required an average differential of $1.23.
Producers with higher herd averages (greater than
14,000 pounds of milk per cow) had statistically
lower seasonality coefficients than farmers with
lower herd averages (14,000 pounds or less) for
$0.00 through $1.00, but not for the $2.00 to $3.00
price difference intervals. The results imply that
the bigher producing herd group, on average, would
balance production at a price differential of $1.00,
while the lower herd average group would do so
at a price difference of $1.20.
The relationships between age and price respon-
siveness, and between the average number of hours
per day that cows were pastured in May and June
and price responsiveness, were also statistically
significant for lower price differentials. Farmers
older than 42 years of age required a price differ-
ential of $1.35 to balance seasonal production, while
farmers younger than 42 years of age needed only
$0.95 to accomplish this. This result is probably
highly correlated with the education result, imply-
ing better management skills of younger and more
educated producers. Producers that relied signifi-
cantly on pasture feeding in the spring were more
seasonal than farmers that utilize pasture less in-
tensively for the $0.00 and $0.35 differentials, but
not for the $1.00 to $3.00 differentials. The av-
erage price differential necessary to balance out
production for these two groups was $1.19 and
$1.03, respectively. However, based on t-ratios,
these two average price differentials were not sta-
tistically different from each other at the 10% sig-
nificance level.
Summary and Implications
The purpose of this research was to analyze ex-
pected production response to four hypothetical
seasonal price differentials designed to lessen sea-
sonality in New York, including $0.00, $1.00,
$2.00, and $3.00 per cwt. price deductions/pre-
miums. Anticipated production response was es-
timated using data from a random mail survey and
federal milk marketing order farm level data on
survey respondents. A total of 343 producer re-
sponses were used in the estimating production re-
sponse and two simulations were performed. The
first simulation was performed on the entire sample
to determine: (1) estimated seasonality coefficients
by price differential; (2) the estimated differential
needed to balance spring and fall milk production;
and (3) to test whether there was a statistical dif-
ference between the Louisville plan and no sea-
sonal price differential on seasonality. The second
simulation examined whether certain sub-groups in
the sample would respond differently to the price
differentials.
The results of the first simulation showed that
the seasonality coefficient ranged from 0.19 to
– 0.17 for the $0.00 to $3.00 per cwt. differentials.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that
it would take a seasonal price differential of about
$1.12 per cwt. to eliminate seasonality in New
York. over three times the current differential. In
addition, it was shown that the current Louisville
plan is effective in significantly reducing season-
ality compared with no program at all. The results
of the second simulation illustrated several striking
differences between sub-groups of farmers in the
sample. In general, producers who: were members
of DHI, had more years of formal education, had
larger herd sizes and greater production per cow,
were younger, and who relied less intensively on
pasture feeding were able to balance spring and fall
production at a lower price differential than their
counterparts in the sample,
There are several important comments worth
noting. The $1.12 price differential estimated in
this research to balance seasonality would likely
be unacceptable to farmers. Moreover, a $1.12 price
penalty/premium would probably be rejected by the
overseers of the federal milk marketing order pro-
gram, the Agricultural Marketing Service of USDA.
Thus, it appears that seasonality will not be totally
eliminated through the pricing structure alone, which
is not surprising.
On the other hand, the present price differential
under the Louisville plan is probably too low, since
it has not been adjusted since 1972. In real terms,
the current differential is far lower than it was in
1972. For example, when deflated by the consumer
price index, the $0.35 differential today is less than
one-half of what it was in 1972. Consequently,
doubling the current seasonal price differential in
New York may be reasonable and politically ac-
ceptable. Based on the empirical estimates of ex-
pected production response in Figure 2, if the $0.35
differential was increased to $0.70, the seasonality
coefficient would fall from O.15 to 0.08, reducing
seasonality to one-half its current level. The same
result might be accomplished with a Base-Excess
program, if the differential was equivalent to this.
Policy makers might also consider changing these
differentials from an absolute amount to a per-
centage of the annual average price so that inflation
would not erode the differential. For example, rather
than doubling the current differential to $0.70, the
differential could be fixed at 6~0 of the market price
($0.70 divided by the 1986 annual average price
$12.09). Using this or a comparable adjustment
mechanism would protect the financial incentivesKaiser, Oltenacu, and Smith Milk Production in New York 55
offered by these programs from becoming trivial
in inflation adjusted terms.
While seasonal price incentives alone are not
likely to eliminate seasonality completely, the find-
ings in this study are promising, Increasing the
current differential would be expected to have a
significant impact on this problem. Additionally,
educational programs by institutions such as dairy
cooperatives and Cooperative Extension to make
farmers aware of the problem and to offer advice
on management techniques to lower seasonality
would undoubted y help. Finally, if cooperatives
and proprietary handlers found it profitable to im-
plement their own seasonal plans in addition to
those of the federal milk marketing order’s, further
reductions in seasonality are possible.
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